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ABSTRACT 
 
JUSTIN J. HOPKINS: Does Shareholder Litigation Matter? 
(Under the direction of Jana Raedy and Edward Maydew) 
 
 
This study examines whether an unexpected shock to the risk of class-action lawsuits filed 
under securities laws affects the level of discretionary revenues, the market reaction to 
unexpected revenues, and the likelihood of restatements. I identify a court decision that 
reduced the risk of shareholder litigation for firms headquartered within a single jurisdiction. 
Subsequent to the decision, the likelihood of a restatement and the level of discretionary 
revenues increased while the market reaction to unexpected revenues declined for firms 
headquartered in this jurisdiction relative to firms headquartered in other jurisdictions. 
Further, these changes were driven primarily by firms that faced the highest risk of 
shareholder litigation. Overall, results indicate that the risk of shareholder litigation 
constrains managers from making opportunistic reporting choices. This study is relevant to 
the global policy debate about class-action litigation as a mechanism to regulate securities 
markets. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Shareholder lawsuits for violations of securities fraud (class actions) impose a tremendous burden 
on the U.S. economy and judicial system, but provide uncertain benefits. In the average year, investors 
file 200 lawsuits alleging losses of hundreds of billions, while firms pay billions to settle and defend these 
claims (Research, 2009).
1
 Further, many liken settlement payments to “extortion” and allege that these 
lawsuits are frivolous, inhibit the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets and endanger thousands of 
jobs and billions of revenues for U.S. firms (Forum, 2007; Romano, 1991; Bloomberg & Schumer, 2007; 
Pritchard, 2009). Yet, given the substantial costs, it is not clear whether these lawsuits accrue important 
benefits in terms of financial market regulation. Some claim that these lawsuits "[deter] fraud"
2
, and are 
“an essential supplement to [public enforcers]”.3 However, others suggest "private class actions move a 
lot of money around, but add little to deterrence at the margin” (Pritchard, 2009). Accordingly, this paper 
examines the alleged benefits of class actions by testing whether an unexpected decline in litigation risk 
affects the levels of discretionary revenues, the market reactions to unexpected revenues and the 
likelihood of restatements. 
This question is timely as policy makers around the world are debating and adopting legal 
reforms to encourage class-action litigation in all areas of law.
4
  Restoring confidence in and 
                                                     
1
 In this paper I refer only to class-action lawsuits brought by shareholders under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and subsequent amendments. Hence, when referring to lawsuits or class-action 
lawsuits I refer specifically to lawsuits filed by shareholders under securities laws as opposed to other types of class-
action lawsuits or lawsuits brought by public regulators under securities laws. 
2
 See Justice Kennedy in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo (544 U.S. 336, 2005). 
3
 See Justice Ginsberg in Tellabs Inc, v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd. 551 U.S. 308. 
4
 In the U.S. see, for instance, The Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111
th
 
Cong (2009), Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, S., 111
th
 Cong 2009, Securities Litigation 
Attorney Accountability and Transparency Act, HR 5491 (2006). For examples in other jurisdictions, see Taiwan 
(Lin, 2008), South Korea (Chung 2004), Italy (Comolli, De Santis, Lo Passo, 2010), Canada (Berenblut, Heys and 
Starykh, 2009), Japan (Ikeya and Kishitani, 2010) and Australia (Houston et al., 2009). For descriptions of legal 
2 
 
strengthening the stability of financial markets is a major impetus behind this movement.  Hence, in light 
of the tremendous costs class actions impose and the global trend to encourage this litigation, whether 
these lawsuits improve the financial reporting process by constraining managers from adopting aggressive 
reporting practices is an important and timely topic. 
Furthermore, whether class actions affect financial reporting choices is not apparent for the 
following reasons. First, the corporation and insurance companies pay the majority of the costs of 
litigation. In fact, individual directors and executives, on average, personally only contribute around 0.4% 
of the total settlements. Their personal costs may be too low to prevent managers from reporting 
opportunistically relative to the gains they can accrue (Coffee, 1986). For instance, Gary Winnick, 
founder of Global Crossing, personally paid $55 million to the settlement, which was one of the largest 
sums ever paid by an individual. However, he earned over $730 million by selling stock prior to the 
collapse (Morgenson, 2005). Second, many class actions may be baseless allegations unrelated to the 
reliability or accuracy of firm disclosures (Pritchard, 2009; Alexander, 1991; Grundfest, 1995). Third, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys arguably have no incentive to structure settlements in order to punish those culpable. 
In fact, these attorneys could actually gain from future securities violations by representing shareholders 
in subsequent lawsuits. Fourth, shareholders are widely dispersed and recover only 2-3% of losses which 
may be insufficient to provide incentives to vigorously monitor management. Since it is not clear whether 
class actions affect financial reporting choices, empirical studies are needed to guide policy debates.    
Despite the ubiquity of class actions and their growing importance in regulating securities 
markets, sparse empirical evidence exists regarding whether lawsuits improve the financial reporting 
process.  Extant literature focuses on the relation between litigation and management earnings forecasts 
(Johnson, Kasznik, & Nelson, 2001; Baginski, Hassell, & Kimbrough, 2002; Francis, Philbrick, & 
Schipper, 1994; Field, Lowry, & Shu, 2005; Skinner, 1994; Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009) or how the 
level of discretionary accruals differ before and after a firm in the same industry faces SEC investigations 
                                                                                                                                                                           
reforms recently adopted in Argentina, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden see Behrens, et al. (2009) for details. 
3 
 
and class-action litigation (Jennings, Kedia, & Rajgopal, 2011).  In contrast, this study examines whether 
an unexpected change in litigation risk affects financial reporting choices reflected in mandatory 
disclosures. Hence, it provides evidence of the possible financial reporting consequences of policy 
reforms affecting class-action litigation. 
My research design focuses on a specific court decision, Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities 
Litigation (SGI), which reduced the risk of shareholder litigation under securities laws for firms 
headquartered within the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit).
5,6
 Prior 
literature has empirically demonstrated that the SGI decision affected legal outcomes such as dismissals 
(Pritchard & Sale, 2005). Further, as discussed below, since SGI was unexpected, widely publicized in 
popular media, unlikely to be driven by environmental factors and only affected firms headquartered in 
the Ninth Circuit, it provides a strong setting to test the research question.
7
   
I examine the changes in the levels of discretionary revenues, the market reactions to unexpected 
revenues, and the likelihood of a restatement for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit relative to firms 
headquartered in other federal circuits. The empirical tests focus on the revenue account because a 
majority of lawsuits allege manipulations in this account (Cornerstone Research, 2005) and a recent study 
concludes that 60% of fraud in public companies involves revenue (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & 
Neal, 2010). I also focus on firms that face the highest level of litigation risk as prior research has 
                                                     
5
 The following reasons are some that motivate Johnson et al. (1999) to examine the same setting to test the 
valuation implications of shareholder lawsuits under securities laws. 
6
 The Silicon Graphics decision reduced litigation risk by requiring that plaintiffs provide evidence that the 
defendant acted with “deliberate recklessness”. The prior standard, established by GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation 
(42 F.3d 1541), held that “plaintiffs may aver scienter generally, just as the rule states - that is, simply by saying that 
scienter existed”. This standard required one of the lowest levels of proof among all circuits. Hence, in one decision, 
the Ninth Circuit moved from among the least restrictive in terms of evidence required to demonstrate scienter to 
among the most restrictive. See the following section for more detail. 
7
 While shareholders may file lawsuits in any federal jurisdiction, as elucidated below, the vast majority of lawsuits 
are consolidated and moved to the district where the firm is headquartered (Cox, Randall, & Bai, 2009). See section 
2.2 for further details. 
4 
 
demonstrated that this may vary by firm characteristics (Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009; Kim & Skinner, 
2010; Cao & Narayanamoorthy, 2009; Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper, 1994; Kasznik & Lev, 1995).
8
  
Results indicate that a decline in litigation risk is detrimental to quality of the financial reporting 
process. Before the decision, firms facing a high risk of litigation in the Ninth Circuit reported low levels 
of discretionary revenues relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. This is consistent with prior literature 
suggesting that firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit faced a more punitive legal regime during this 
period (Grundfest & Pritchard, 2002; Sale, 1998; Gibney, 2001; Perino, 2003). After the decision, 
however, the level of discretionary revenues increased to a level on par with firms located in other 
jurisdictions, and the market response to unexpected revenues declined for this subset of firms indicating 
that the reporting change was opportunistic in nature. Lastly, the likelihood of a restatement increased for 
the average firm headquartered within the Ninth Circuit relative to firms headquartered elsewhere, and 
this result is driven by firms that face a high risk of litigation.  
This paper demonstrates that the risk of private securities litigation constrains managers from 
adopting opportunistic and aggressive accounting choices. Accordingly, it suggests that class-action 
lawsuits filed under securities laws serve an important role to regulate securities markets, and are not just 
frivolous allegations as many have argued. As such, it contributes to the literature that examines the 
determinants and consequences of litigation risk in terms of accounting outcomes (Baginski, Hassell, & 
Kimbrough, 2002; Field, Lowry, & Shu, 2005; Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper, 1994; Johnson, Kasznik, & 
Nelson, 2001; Johnson, Nelson & Pritchard 2007; Kasznik & Lev 1995; Palmrose & Scholz, 2004; 
Rogers & Stocken 2005; Skinner, 1994; Skinner, 1997; Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009). Further, it 
contributes to the literature in law and economics that examines the economic benefits of class actions (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006; Coffee, 2006; Jackson & Roe, 2009; Cox & Thomas, 2009). 
This paper is organized in six sections. The next section provides institutional detail on securities 
litigation. The third reviews related literature and outlines the hypotheses. The fourth details the empirical 
model of the tests. The fifth interprets the empirical results, and the last concludes. 
                                                     
8
 As discussed in section 4.4, I use industry and size to identify firms that face a high risk of litigation. 
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2.0 Institutional Background on Securities Laws 
2.1 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) in response to 
complaints that class-action lawsuits filed under securities laws impose significant costs on the economy. 
The PSLRA included several provisions to reduce baseless lawsuits and ease the legal burden on 
corporations and third party actors such as law and accounting firms. One of the key areas of reform 
heightened the standards plaintiffs must plead in order to enter into the discovery phase and gather 
evidence of fraud.  
Prior to PSLRA, shareholders could file a lawsuit against a corporation with relatively little 
evidence of misrepresentation on the part of the corporation. The plaintiffs could gather evidence during 
the discovery process. Congress sought to limit these "fishing expeditions" by delaying discovery until 
the plaintiff survived pretrial defense motions.  Specifically, PSLRA requires that, in order to pass pretrial 
motions to dismiss, plaintiffs must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind" (§78u-Fb2).  
Subsequently, circuits interpreted the phrase “strong inference" differently.  The Second and 
Third Circuits held that Congress intended to codify their pre PSLRA standard of demonstrating either (1) 
motive and opportunity or (2) strong circumstantial evidence of recklessness or conscious misbehavior (as 
illustrated in Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F. 3d 1124, 1128, 2d Cir. 1994).
9
  Other circuits (the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth) determined that Congress intended to raise the pleading 
requirement above that which existed in the Second and Third Circuits prior to PSLRA. Finally, the Ninth 
Circuit interpreted PSLRA’s pleading provision in the strictest manner.  In Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. 
                                                     
9
 Regarding the interpretation of the Second Circuit, see Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F. 3d 529, (“The 
[PSLRA] heightened the requirement for pleading scienter to the level used by the Second Circuit.”) Regarding the 
third Circuit, see Meckenstock v. International Heritage, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21042, *17 (E.D.N.C. 1998). 
6 
 
Securities Litigation (SGI) the Ninth Circuit required plaintiffs to "plead, at a minimum, particular facts 
giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate recklessness." (See Figure 1 for a geographic representation 
of the structure of the federal court system.) 
2.2  Re:Silicon Graphics, Inc., Securities Litigation 
The intent of this paper is to test whether a change in litigation risk, such as those currently 
debated around the globe, affect managers’ financial reporting choices. As such, the setting is critical as it 
must replicate, to the closest degree possible, an actual policy intervention. In this respect, the Silicon 
Graphics decision is nearly ideal for the following six reasons. 
First, it interpreted the pleading requirement, which can dramatically affect the outcome of the 
case. Judge Nygaard called these requirements the "key that opens access to courts".
10
 Empirically, 
studies demonstrate that these differences had a material effect on both the rate that courts dismiss claims 
(Pritchard & Sale, 2005) as well as the amount of claims filed (Perino, 2003).  Hence, the SGI decision is 
a powerful setting as it led to a strong shift in litigation risk. 
Second, the SGI decision primarily affects firms headquartered in a single jurisdiction, the Ninth 
Circuit, which is a critical element of the research design. Shareholders can file a securities class-action 
lawsuit in any district where the corporation has an economic presence. However, over 85% of class 
actions are ultimately consolidated and litigated in the federal district where the corporation maintains its 
headquarters (Cox, Thomas, & Bai, 2009).
11
 Therefore, the litigation risk managers face is apparent at the 
time they make financial reporting choices. Furthermore, since only public firms headquartered in the 
Ninth Circuit are affected by the decision, the remaining firms can be utilized as a control group. This 
                                                     
10
 Philllips v. Allegheny (515 F.3d 224). 
11
 Shareholders from multiple jurisdictions are likely to file a lawsuit on any given occasion. When this occurs, a 
multijurisdictional legal panel will consolidate the lawsuits and, most likely, convene the proceedings in the most 
convenient jurisdiction, which is where the witnesses and documents are located. Further, even if only one 
shareholder filed a lawsuit in a circuit favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant can move to relocate the lawsuit to the 
district where the firm is headquartered. It is costly and time consuming for the plaintiff to argue against this motion. 
Since most witnesses and documentation will be located in this district, the courts do not look favorably upon 
plaintiffs who “venue shop”. 
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design creates a natural control for changes in the business environment, such as macro economic shocks, 
which enhances the validity of the study. 
Third, the SGI decision was widely publicized and coverage clearly articulated how it would 
affect firms.
12
 The AP newswire covered the decision the day of the announcement, July 2, 1999. Then, 
the San Francisco Chronicle, the San Jose Mercury News and the Los Angeles Times reported on the 
decision the next day, a Saturday. The following Monday it was covered in the Wall Street Journal.
13
 
Furthermore, writers indicated the effect of the decision on litigation risk suggesting that “future lawsuits 
against high-tech firms in Silicon Valley appear to have little chance of success” (Holding & Carlsen, 
1999). Since this paper examines the effect of court decisions on managerial reporting choices, it is 
critical that managers were aware of these decisions and their effect on the risk of class-action litigation. 
Fourth, given the judicial history of the Ninth Circuit the manner in which it interpreted the 
pleading provision of PSLRA was a surprise. Prior to PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit adopted among the 
lowest pleading provisions of all circuits (Gibney, 2001).
14
 In contrast to the plaintiff-friendly 
environment that existed prior to PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit adopted the highest standard of all circuits 
after the PSLRA (Grundfest & Pritchard, 2002).  Thus, with one split decision, the Ninth Circuit 
unexpectedly moved from one of the easiest circuits to certify a class action to one of the most difficult. 
Since it was not anticipated, firms could not gradually phase in changes to reporting regimes making it a 
powerful setting to examine changes in financial reporting choices. 
Fifth, the process of judge selection and the manner in which judges decide cases suggests that 
the outcome of the SGI decision was not driven by contemporaneous financial reporting choices. The 
                                                     
12
 Many decisions were important in establishing precedence and determining future legal outcomes in all 
jurisdictions. However, since I examine the managerial response to changes in the litigation environment, it is 
important that managers are also informed of the decision and its potential effect on future outcomes of shareholder 
security litigation. Consistent with law literature on PSLRA, I searched factiva and found that none of the following 
decisions were covered in the business press that might have reached corporate reporting decision makers: Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, Wright v. Ernst & Young 152 F.3d, and South Ferry LP #2 v. 
Killinger F.3d, 2008. Hence, I focus my examination on the SGI decision as it was heavily covered in the business 
press. 
13
 Further, this decision prompted the San Francisco Chronicle to conduct a five-part series on ethical lapses in the 
Silicon Valley and corporate fraud. 
14
 See Re: Glenfed Securities Litigation 42 F.2d 1059 1985. 
8 
 
Ninth Circuit’s policy for selecting judges is based on “random draw from the circuit-wide pool of senior 
and active judges”.15 Also, recent research indicates that judges decide cases in accordance with personal 
beliefs and characteristics suggesting that environmental factors did not affect the outcome (Altieri, 
Apple, Marquette, & Moore, 2001; Schneider, 2002).
16
 Further, corporate fraud occurred regularly in the 
Ninth Circuit at the time of the SGI decision (Beasley, Carcello, & Hermanson, 1999). Hence, if judges 
were responding to the environment, the decision would have been to encourage, not constrain, private 
litigation. These factors all indicate that reverse causality is less of an issue in this setting. 
Sixth, it is well recognized that, at the time of the SGI decision, the Ninth Federal Circuit was the 
most important venue in terms of the volume of class-action securities lawsuits (Pritchard & Sale, 2005). 
Hence, an examination of securities lawsuits must emphasize this important legal jurisdiction.  
In summary, this study contributes to the debate as to whether class actions should be encouraged 
or stymied. As such, the setting should mirror a policy change as closely as possible. The SGI decision is 
a good setting as it was well publicized, unexpected, important to judicial outcomes, unlikely to be caused 
by environmental factors and its affect on firms’ litigation risk was unambiguous and known at the time 
managers made reporting choices. 
  
                                                     
15
 See section 3.2.1 of The General Orders for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Circuit 2010). 
16
 At the time of the SGI decision, 23 active judges sat on the Ninth Circuit. The panel which decided the SGI case 
was composed of 3 judges: Browning, Sneed and Rhoades. Based on measures of judicial ideology, Sneed and 
Rhoades were two of the most conservative judges in the circuit while Browning was one of the most liberal judges 
(Nixon 2004). Their decisions reflected those preferences: Browning voted for greater shareholder protection while 
Sneed and Rhoades voted to constrain litigation. This suggests, at least in the case of the SGI decision, that judicial 
preferences reflect deeper personal accords and beliefs and not just a response to the environment. 
9 
 
 
 
 
3.0 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
3.1 Literature Review 
This paper examines how the risk of class-action lawsuits filed under securities laws affects 
discretionary revenues, market reactions and restatements. Thus, it is related to literatures examining the 
consequences of shareholder litigation in terms of economic and accounting outcomes as well as the 
determinants and consequences of financial restatements. This section reviews these studies below. 
One stream of literature, grounded in law and economics, examines the economic effects of 
private enforcement of securities laws (via shareholder lawsuits and market disciplinary actions) and 
public enforcement mechanisms (via regulators). La Porta et al. (2006) theorize that regulators cannot 
marshal the resources necessary to adequately discipline corporations and lack financial incentives to 
vigorously pursue violators of securities laws. They survey legal experts in 49 countries and find that the 
private enforcement mechanisms (liability standards and disclosure requirements) are positively related to 
financial development while the public enforcement measures are not. Coffee (2007) argues that these 
results are misleading as they only measure the "laws on the books" and not the strength of the regulator. 
Jackson and Roe (2009) follow by examining the relation between measures capturing the strength of the 
regulator and financial development. They find that both public and private mechanisms of enforcement 
lead to financial development. The current study contributes to this literature by examining one channel 
through which private securities litigation might affect financial market development: by enhancing the 
veracity of firm-specific accounting information. 
A significant literature examines how litigation risk affects firm-specific information in terms of 
the occurrence, frequency, timing, precision and accuracy of management earnings forecasts. These 
papers suggest that litigation risk does not affect the accuracy of management forecasts (Johnson, 
Kasznik, & Nelson, 2001; Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009). But, the propensity of a firm to issue an 
10 
 
earnings forecast is decreasing in litigation risk (Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009; Baginski, Hassell, & 
Kimbrough, 2002). Alternatively, some studies suggest that litigation risk may create incentives for 
managers to preempt bad news which might discourage litigation (Skinner, 1994; Field, Lowry, & Shu, 
2005; Kasznik & Lev, 1995), and reduce the costs of litigation (Skinner, 1997). However, other studies 
indicate that voluntary disclosures do not deter litigation (Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper, Shareholder 
litigation and corporate disclosures, 1994; Johnson, Kasznik, & Nelson, 2001). 
While these papers examine the link between litigation risk and voluntary disclosure, they do not 
address the effect of litigation risk on mandatory financial reports as opposed to announcements or 
descriptions of the reports. Yet, mandatory financial statements are fundamentally different from 
voluntary earnings guidance. For example, the accuracy of managerial estimates will be readily verified 
shortly after the forecast when earnings are released. Hence, misrepresentations or errors will be quickly 
discovered while erroneous or fraudulent accounting estimates may take years to be revealed.  Further, 
voluntary forecasts are less affected by contractual incentives than actual financial data. Overall, this 
literature makes significant contributions, but does not examine the effect of litigation risk on financial 
reporting choices reflected in mandatory disclosures. Alternatively, the following two papers examine 
financial reporting choices in different contexts. 
Qiang (2007) examines the interrelated roles of conditional and unconditional conservatism under 
costs induced by contracting, litigation, regulation and taxes. She finds that conditional and unconditional 
conservatism for 633 firms over the period 1988-1999 are unique and firms tradeoff one for the other. 
Further, both conditional and unconditional conservatism are related to litigation risk.  
In concurrent research, Jennings et al. (2011) compare the level of discretionary accruals two 
years before and two years after either the SEC publicly discloses an investigation of a firm in the same 
industry or a firm in the same industry faces class-action litigation. Their setting allows them to examine 
specific features of the SEC’s enforcement regime and make interesting comparisons of public 
enforcement (via SEC investigations) and private enforcement (via lawsuits) of securities laws. They find 
11 
 
that discretionary accruals decline in the periods following both public SEC investigations and class-
action litigation. 
While these papers are interesting, the current study features a unique setting with two important 
characteristics that enhance the validity of the research design over other research. First, the SGI decision 
represents an unexpected shift in litigation risk. This is critical because studies suggest that causality can 
also run from accounting outcomes to litigation (Johnson, Nelson, & Pritchard, 2006; Palmrose & Scholz, 
2004). However, as noted in section 2.2, the institutional features of the current setting make reverse 
causality unlikely. Further, the SGI decision primarily affected only a subset of firms determined by 
geography. The difference-in-differences design featured in this study tests changes in financial reporting 
practices within industries. This is important as accounting outcomes are driven by innate factors that are 
affected by routine business cycles and industry norms (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005). 
Overall, since I focus exclusively on the financial reporting consequences of shareholder litigation (as 
opposed to comparing litigation with SEC enforcements as in Jennings et al. (2011)) I can examine a 
sharper setting and construct finer tests that naturally rule out many alternative explanations. 
Finally, the sharp rise in restatements and accounting scandals after PSLRA spurred scholars to 
study the underlying causes and consequences of financial statement irregularities. These studies attribute 
diverse factors to the rise in restatements such as: market pressures to maintain or grow share prices, 
managerial compensation incentives, outdated standards ill equipped to guide complex transactions, 
proliferation of new standards, internal error and earnings management (Palmrose & Scholz, 2004; 
Plumlee & Yohn, 2010; GAO, 2002). In terms of consequences of restatements, a few studies 
demonstrate that restatements increase the likelihood of a class-action lawsuit. (Johnson, Nelson, & 
Pritchard, 2007; Palmrose & Scholz, 2004). While interesting, these studies do not examine whether the 
12 
 
risk of litigation deters restatements.
17
 Thus, this paper is unique because it provides evidence of the role 
of private litigation in affecting the frequency of restatements. 
3.2 Arguments for Alternative Hypotheses 
Whether class actions constrain managers from adopting aggressive reporting policies is an open 
question. Some argue that shareholder lawsuits are an integral component of the regulatory structure of 
the financial markets. Justice Ginsburg reflects “This Court has long recognized that meritorious private 
actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions 
and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) [emphasis added]” (Tellabs Inc, v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd. 551 U.S. 
308). On the other hand, an expert in securities law testified before the Senate suggesting “private class 
actions [lawsuits] move a lot of money around, but add little to deterrence at the margin” (Pritchard, 
2009). While private litigation, as an enforcement mechanism, may constrain managers' financial 
reporting choices, there are five reasons why it may not.  
First, the costs any individual bears may be too low to discipline managers from violating 
securities laws (Coffee, 2006). In the aggregate, individual executives or directors contribute only around 
0.4% of total settlements whereas insurance companies and the corporation bear the majority of the cost 
(Dunbar, Foster, Juneja, & Martin, 1995).
18 
This is what prompts Coffee (1986) to suggest that private 
securities litigation is simply a wealth transfer from current to past shareholders less considerable legal 
fees. And, this circularity makes it impossible to hold managers accountable for misdeeds. 
Empirically, it is not clear whether class actions levy reputational penalties on managers, 
executives and directors. Helland (2006) finds that directors actually gain more directorships in other 
firms after serving on the board of a firm sued for violating securities laws. He suggests that lawsuits are 
                                                     
17
 For the reasons noted in the next section, it does not follow that litigation reduces restatements just because 
restatements may increase the likelihood of litigation. 
18
 Consider, for instance, that the largest sum that an individual ever paid in regards to settling a class action suit was 
the Chairman of Global Crossing, Gary Winnick, who paid $55 million. However, this was less than 10% of the 
$734 million he earned by selling stock at an inflated level (Morgenson, 2005). 
13 
 
so commonplace that they actually improve director's human capital in a meaningful way. Srinivasan 
(2005) samples 135 class actions that follow a restatement and finds that only 5.5% of the outside 
directors and audit committee members are named in the lawsuit. This suggests that directors do not face 
explicit penalties. However, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find that outside directors of firms that face class 
action securities lawsuits reduce board seats in other firms. And, the departure at the interconnected firm 
is viewed positively by investors.  
Overall, this literature does not provide strong evidence that managers face implicit penalties, 
suggesting that they may not respond to changes in litigation risk. Furthermore, even if managers did face 
career concerns, the "final period problem" suggests that the greater the likelihood that the manager will 
be dismissed, the less he or she can be dissuaded from committing fraud (Gulati, 1999). 
Second, if class actions are meritless, managers may not have the ability to prevent them through 
their financial reporting choices.  And, some argue that many lawsuits have no merit (Alexander, 1991; 
Grundfest, 1995; Pritchard, 2009; O'Brien, 1993). Furthermore, if directors and shareholders perceive that 
lawsuits are frivolous they may be less likely to penalize financial officers and those culpable. 
Third, the institutional structure of lawsuits may preclude any deterrence effect. Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have strong profit motives to file and litigate class actions. However, they have no incentive to 
structure settlements to deter future violations. In fact, these attorneys can actually gain from future 
securities violations by representing injured shareholders. 
Fourth, the dispersed nature of shareholders and low recover values lead to collective action 
problems. In aggregate, shareholders only recover 2-3% of losses incurred by alleged wrongdoings 
(Milev, Patton, & Starykh, 2011). Furthermore, dispersed ownership reduces incentives for shareholders 
to monitor executives and hold individuals accountable for infractions of laws that reduce shareholder 
values (Berle & Means, 1932; Jackson & Roe, 2009).  
Fifth, managers with financial reporting responsibilities may be simply unaware of the actual risk 
of shareholder litigation.  Under these conditions, changes in litigation risk cannot affect firm choices. 
14 
 
In conclusion, it is not clear whether private litigation affects financial reporting outcomes. While 
some, such as Justice Ginsburg, suggest that these lawsuits accrue important benefits, others disagree. The 
next section details the hypotheses tested in this paper to provide empirical evidence on the debate. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses  
Given the possibility that litigation risk may not affect accounting outcomes, I focus on the most 
powerful setting, which is the revenue account in the subset of firms most likely to respond to changes in 
litigation risk. Revenues are important because, as the Director of Enforcement at the SEC noted, 
“revenue recognition remains the recipe of choice for cooking the books” (Holding, 1999). Furthermore, 
prior research suggests that the likelihood of shareholder litigation varies based on firm characteristics 
(Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009; Kim & Skinner, 2010; Cao & Narayanamoorthy, 2009; Francis, Philbrick, 
& Schipper, 1994). In the context of the Silicon Graphics decision, I argue that size and industry are 
especially relevant identifiers of litigation risk.
19
 
In contrast to the arguments in the prior section, a long line of research in accounting suggests 
that managers alter financial reporting practices in response to changes in incentives and opportunities 
(Jones J., 1991; Christie, 1990; Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010). And, several studies suggest that 
litigation risk does affect managers’ choices as they relate to voluntary disclosures (Johnson, Kasznik, & 
Nelson, 2001; Baginski, Hassell, & Kimbrough, 2002; Skinner, 1994; Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper, 
1994; Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009). Therefore, I believe that this enforcement mechanism may affect 
financial reporting choices, especially for the subset of firms most likely to face shareholder litigation.  
Given that the Silicon Graphics decision reduced the risk of shareholder litigation, I hypothesize, 
in alternative form: 
H1a: In the post-SGI period, high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit recorded more 
discretionary revenues than in the pre-SGI period relative to firms headquartered in other jurisdictions. 
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 I examine this design choice in greater detail in section 4.4. 
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Recording revenues more aggressively after the SGI decision, as suggested in the prior 
hypothesis, may suggest managerial opportunism. If this occurs, the market response, in terms of 
abnormal returns, to revenue surprises should decline indicating that investors are more suspicious of the 
levels of revenues reported. Accordingly, I hypothesize, in alternative form: 
H2a: In the post-SGI period, the market response to unexpected revenues for high-risk firms 
headquartered in the Ninth Circuit was lower than in the pre-SGI period relative to firms headquartered 
in other jurisdictions. 
Finally, I examine the likelihood of a restatement as it adds a different dimension of the financial 
reporting process. The prior empirical measures capture more subtle variations in accounting choices 
across the entire cross section of firms. However, the restatement construct captures more egregious 
violations of GAAP.
20
 In this sense, this measure is closest to the “unethical and unsafe practices” against 
which the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 were intended to protect.
21
 I hypothesize, in alternative form: 
H3a: In the post-SGI period, the likelihood of a restatement for high-risk firms headquartered in the 
Ninth Circuit was higher than in the pre-SGI period relative to firms headquartered in other jurisdictions. 
  
                                                     
20
 Restatements occur for a variety of reasons such as changes in accounting principles. However, I follow a method 
similar to Hennes et al. (2008) and only include the most severe restatements. See section 4.5 for further detail. 
21
 As a definition of the purpose of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, see the message from President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (73d Congress, 1
st
 Sess., H.R. Rep 85, 
1933). 
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4.0 Empirical Design: 
This paper examines whether the SGI ruling affects the subsequent financial reporting decisions 
of managers in firms headquartered in the Ninth Federal Circuit that face the greatest risk of shareholder 
litigation. Hence, research design choices include selecting an appropriate proxy to measure financial 
reporting decisions, modeling the change in this proxy around the SGI decision, and identifying the high-
risk subset of firms. This section discusses these choices. 
4.1 Proxies for Financial Reporting Choices:  
The ideal dependent variable would capture whether a firm's financial reporting choices violated 
securities laws. However, this variable does not exist because one can only judge compliance with 
securities laws after careful ex post analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case. Instead, I 
examine three variables, each capturing a unique aspect of financial reporting. 
4.1.1 Discretionary Revenues 
First, I examine discretionary revenues as measured by Stubben (2010). Conceptually, this 
variable measures the level of premature revenue recognition. Intuitively, it measures the speed by which 
firms recognize revenue, relative to industry peers, controlling for changes in receivables. Hence, it 
allows for an analysis of how litigation risk affects the aggressiveness of revenue recognition across the 
entire cross section of firms. And, to the extent that lawmakers are concerned with aggressive revenue 
recognition, it closely reflects the construct of interest. 
This variable is applicable for the following reasons. First, according to Cornerstone (2005), over 
half of all class action suits filed in 2004 and 2005 alleged that the firm fraudulently recognized revenue. 
Revenue recognition was, by far, the most widespread allegation of accounting malfeasance. Further, a 
recent study concludes that 60% of fraud in public companies affects revenue (Beasley, Carcello, 
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Hermanson, & Neal, 2010). In fact, the Director of Enforcement at the SEC acknowledged that “revenue 
recognition remains the recipe of choice for cooking the books” (Holding, 1999). Hence, for purposes of 
this paper, the sharpest indicator of securities laws violation would be to examine the revenue account. 
Second, Stubben (2010) demonstrates that this measure is more effective in detecting revenue 
manipulation than either the modified Jones model or the Dechow-Dichev measure of accruals. In fact, 
the discretionary revenue model detects over 20% of the instances of revenue manipulation when 1% of 
assets is added to the change in fourth quarter revenues and the receivables accrual. On growth firms, 
many of which may be in my sample, this measure demonstrates less bias (in the form of lower abnormal 
accruals) than other measures of discretionary accruals models on samples where no manipulation is 
induced.  
Finally, this measure outperformed accruals measures in tests against actual financial reporting 
outcomes. Stubben examines 173 firms subject to SEC enforcement for improper revenue recognition and 
concludes that his model has both higher power and lower bias in detecting improper revenue recognition 
policies than accruals models. 
I follow Stubben (2010) and estimate this cross-sectional model by industry and quarter: 
(ARi,q + ARi,q-1 + ARi,q-2 + ARi,q-3) - ( ARi,q-4 + ARi,q-5 + ARi,q-6 + ARi,q-7) =α0 + β1(REVi,q - REVi,q-4) 
+ β2[(REVi,q-1 + REVi,q-2 + REVi,q-3) - (REVi,q-5 + REVi,q-6 + REVi,q-7)] +  ɛ                 (1) 
Where:  
ARi,q =  Net accounts receivable for firm i in quarter q measured from the statement of 
cash flow. 
REVi,q = Total revenues (REVTQ) of firm i in quarter q. 
 
The intercept is allowed to vary over the most recent quarter because sales initiated in this period 
are more likely to remain uncollected than those initiated in prior quarters. The residual represents the 
level of discretionary revenues as it is the portion of the change in accounts receivable that cannot be 
explained by the change in revenues. All variables are scaled by average total assets (ATQq+ATQq-4/2). 
4.1.2 Discretionary Revenues Specification 
18 
 
Consistent with all main empirical analyses in this paper, I examine discretionary revenues in a 
differences-in-differences specification. This model controls for cross-sectional variations in firm-specific 
characteristics that also affect accounting outcomes and are relatively stationary over time. Such 
characteristics could be related to the fundamental earnings process or unobservable characteristics such 
as governance. Further, it also controls for any time-period effects, such as boom or bust cycles. 
Therefore, this model provides a more clear analysis of litigation risk on accounting outcomes than other 
models, such as those examining litigation risks in the cross section.  
To test hypothesis 1, I estimate the following cross-sectional model quarterly over the four-year 
window centered on the event date (July 2, 1999) separately for the high-risk and non-high-risk groups: 
DiscRevi,q =α0 + β1Circuit9i + β2Postq +  β3Circuit9i * Postq  + βiControlsi,q +  ɛ          (2) 
  
Where: 
 DiscRevi,q = The level of discretionary revenues for firm i in quarter q as defined by 
Stubben (2010) as the residual from equation (1).  
Circuit9i = (1) if firm i is headquartered within the Ninth Federal Circuit and (0) 
otherwise.  
Postq = (1) for report dates (RDQ) after the Silicon Graphics decision on July 2, 1999 
and (0) otherwise.   
Controlsi,q= A vector of controls described below. 
 
The coefficient of interest is β3, which measures the change in discretionary revenues for firms 
headquartered in the Ninth Circuit over the event period relative to the change in discretionary revenues 
of other firms. Hypothesis 1 suggests that it is positive and significant over high-risk firms, indicating that 
high-risk firms headquartered within the Ninth Circuit altered revenue recognition policy subsequent to 
the SGI decisions.
22
 
For control variables I use SaleGrowth, ROA and MTB as proxies for growth opportunities that 
may affect the receivable-revenue relation independent of litigation risk. I use Size and BigSix as larger 
firms and those audited by a big six auditor may have different opportunities and abilities to alter revenue 
recognition policies. All variables are defined in Exhibit 1. 
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 I winsorize all continuous variables including DiscRev at the 1% level to reduce the influence of outliers. 
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4.2.1 Market Reaction to Unexpected Revenues: 
In order to examine whether investors became more suspicious of unexpected revenues after the 
SGI decision, I examine the relation between short-window abnormal returns and revenue surprises.
23
  
I follow Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) and model the expectation of revenue surprises as a 
seasonal random walk with a drift using the following methodology: 
         
               
       
                (3) 
Surgei,q is the standardized unexpected revenue growth for firm i in quarter q. The standard deviation of 
revenues (σRevi,q) is taken over the prior 8 quarters and the expectation of revenues is modeled following 
a seasonal random walk with a drift: 
E(Revi,q) = Revi,q-4 + δi,q                     (4) 
Where Rev is the quarterly revenue per share and the drift (δi,q) is modeled as: 
                                
 
                      (5) 
I also follow Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) and model abnormal returns as: 
                       
   
                     (6) 
Where Ri,j is the actual return compounded over the three-day period beginning one day prior to the 
earnings announcement. BRi,j is the return on the size-matched decile portfolio. 
4.2.2 Market Reaction Specification 
To test whether the SGI decision affected the market reaction to unexpected revenues and 
whether the effect is concentrated in the high-risk group, I estimate the following cross-sectional model  
quarterly over the four-year window centered on the event date separately for the high-risk and non-high 
risk groups: 
                                                     
23
 The advantage of this test is that it uses the market as a reference construct to discern a changing pattern in 
revenue recognition policy. In this sense, it complements the other tests which only examine accounting outcomes 
(discretionary revenues and restatements). The drawback to this test is that it requires modeling market expectations 
and measuring abnormal returns, both of which are surely estimated with error. Hence, I expect this measure to be 
noisy. 
 
20 
 
CARi,q = α0 + β1Circuit9i + β2Postq + β3Surgei,q + β4Circuit9i*Surgei,q+ β5Postq*Surgei,q + 
β6Circuit9i*Postq + β7Circuit9i*Postq*Surgei,q + βiControlsi,q + βkControlsi,q*Surgei,q            
+  εi,q                  (7) 
 
Where:  
CARi,q = The cumulative abnormal return for the three-day event window centered on 
the earnings announcement date calculated as the actual return less the portfolio 
based on year-end size decile and compounded over the event period.
24
  
Circuit9i = (1) if firm i was headquartered within the Ninth Circuit and (0) otherwise.  
Postq = (1) for report dates (RDQ) after the Silicon Graphics decision on July 2, 1999 
and (0) otherwise.  
Surgei,q = The standardized unexpected revenue growth defined in equation (3). 
Controlsi,q= A vector of controls described below. 
 
The coefficient of interest is β7, which represents the incremental change in the revenue response 
coefficient for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit after the SGI decision relative to firms 
headquartered in other jurisdictions. Based on hypothesis 2, I expect it to be negative when estimated over 
high-risk firms. 
Consistent with prior papers that examine the relation between unexpected earnings and short-
window returns I control for a variety of firm characteristics that may alter the relation between revenues 
and returns independent of litigation risk (Blouin, Raedy, & Shackelford, 2003; Hayn, 1995). All of the 
following variables except Nonlinear are inserted in the specification individually and interacted with 
Surge resulting in a vector of 11 terms: Nonlinear, MTB, Persist, Size, Predict, Expense Surprise 
(ExpenseSurp), Loss and Beta. All variables are defined in Exhibit 1. 
I restrict this test to firms that have the eight necessary lags of quarterly revenues to calculate the 
drift term.  
4.3.1 The Likelihood of a Restatement 
This paper examines whether litigation risk constrains managers from making opportunistic 
financial reporting choices. However, restatements can occur for a variety of seemingly innocuous 
reasons such as a change in GAAP. Hence, the ideal measure would capture only restatements caused by 
managerial decisions to intentionally bias reporting. Since that variable does not exist, I follow a method 
                                                     
24
 I obtain the daily portfolio returns from CRSP ERDPORT1 dataset. 
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similar to Hennes et al. (2008). Specifically, I classify a restatement as intentional if any of the following 
occur: the restatement announcement explicitly mentions the term “fraud”, the SEC publicly disclosed an 
investigation into the accounting issue, or there is a subsequent class-action lawsuit.
25
 While this method 
is certainly not perfect, restatements captured will likely be those more damaging to the reputation of the 
firm and consumer confidence in financial reporting processes than other restatements. Hence, these 
restatements more closely reflect regulators intentions to prevent abuses of the financial reporting process. 
4.3.2 Restatement specification 
Restatements pose a unique challenge in a quarterly event study because firms often restate the 
entire year. Thus, quarterly financials filed before the SGI decision could be restated for GAAP violations 
that occur after the SGI decision. Therefore, I exclude fiscal years that overlap the SGI decision and 
compare the two years prior to the excluded year with the two years subsequent to the excluded year.
26
  I 
examine the following cross-sectional, logistic model estimated quarterly over this period: 
Restatei,q =α0 + β1Circuit9i + β2Postq + β3Circuit9i * Postq  + βiControlsi,q  + ɛ            (8) 
 
Where: 
Restatei,q = (1) if the quarterly observation was subsequently restated because of an 
intentional misapplication of GAAP and (0) otherwise.  
Circuit9i = (1) if firm i was headquartered within the Ninth Circuit and (0) otherwise.  
Postq = (1) for report dates (RDQ) after the Silicon Graphics decision on July 2, 1999 
and (0) otherwise.  
Controlsi,q = A vector of controls described below. 
The coefficient of interest is β3, which measures the change in the likelihood of a restatement for 
firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit after the SGI decision, relative to firms headquartered outside the 
Ninth Circuit.
27
  Hypothesis 3 suggests that it is positive indicating that restatements increased for firms 
headquartered within the Ninth Circuit subsequent to the SGI decisions. 
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 Given that class-action lawsuits declined after the SGI decision (Perino, 2003), the choice to include restatements 
with a corresponding lawsuit will bias the test against finding an increase in restatements after the decision. 
26
 I also run this model over a four-year period centered on the event date, consistent with the prior models. 
Conclusions are not sensitive to this change. 
27
 Ai and Norton (2003) demonstrate that the coefficient, β3, estimated in a nonlinear model, such as equation (8), 
does not reflect the full change in the relation between the likelihood of a restatement and one of the interaction 
terms brought about by a change in the other interaction term. This is because β3 represents the change in the 
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Controlsi,q are a vector of variables to control for changes in the firm over the event window and 
include: MTB, ROA, Leverage, BigSix, SaleGrowth and Size following prior literature (Agrawal & 
Chadha, 2005). All variables are defined in Exhibit 1. 
4.4 Identification of high-risk firms 
Prior research suggests that the likelihood of shareholder litigation varies across firms based on 
characteristics such as size and industry (Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009; Kim & Skinner, 2010; Cao & 
Narayanamoorthy, 2009; Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper, 1994).
28
 In the context of the Silicon Graphics 
decision, these characteristics are especially relevant identifiers of cross-sectional differences in firm 
responses to changes in litigation risk.  
Size is an important identifier for the following three reasons. First, it is well recognized that 
attorneys have little incentive to bring costly litigation against smaller firms that have fewer resources to 
pay settlements (Cox, Thomas, & Kiku, 2006; Perino, 2003). Second, PSLRA requires that lawsuits 
proceed past the defendant’s initial dismissal motions in order to reach the discovery phase. Hence, the 
plaintiff’s complaint must be based on either public information or testimony obtained from a 
whistleblower. Larger firms will have more public information available upon which a case can be built 
and more employees which can potentially serve as whistleblowers. So, ex ante, it will be easier to build a 
case which withstands dismissal motions for larger than smaller firms. Third, size also captures how well 
the firm is informed about the actual litigation risk it faces. Larger firms are more likely to be staffed with 
in-house counsel and others informed about relevant case law. These firms may also have more extensive 
processes that require review or approval of accounting choices by individuals familiar with litigation 
risk. Thus, not only does size affect the actual risk of litigation, but size also affects the link between 
                                                                                                                                                                           
probability function and not the change in the expectation of a restatement. They propose a technique to properly 
determine the full interaction effect that has been adopted by previous papers (Bushman, Dai, & Wang, 2010). I 
follow this research and compute the marginal effect of the interaction term using the delta method. 
28
 The difference-in-difference specifications in tables 3 and 4 utilize the high-risk indicator for testing discretionary 
revenues and the market reaction to unexpected revenues. However, the restatement tests in Table 6 and the short-
window tests in Table 8 demonstrate a shift in financial reporting choices for the average firm headquartered in the 
Ninth Circuit. Hence, the general conclusions drawn in this paper are not sensitive to the use of this variable.  
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actual litigation risk and accounting choices. Accordingly, in this paper, I set a size threshold as assets 
that exceed $100 million.
29
  
Similarly, industry is an important measure of litigation risk for the following reasons. First, it is 
well recognized that certain industries were most frequently subjected to class-action lawsuits, especially 
in the geographic area comprising the Ninth Circuit during the period of the SGI decision (Grundfest & 
Perino, 1997; Jones & Weingram, 1996; Johnson, Nelson, & Prichard, 1999; Johnson, Kasznik, & 
Nelson, 2001; Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper, 1994). Second, firms in these industries were instrumental 
in lobbying for PSLRA and subsequent legislation that constrained litigation (Eaton, 1998). Finally, 
popular press accounts of the Silicon Graphics decision emphasized the importance of the decision to the 
specific industries.
30
 Following Francis et al. (1994) I identify high-risk industries as biotechnology, 
software, hardware, electronics and retailing industries. See Exhibit 1 for definitions of these industries. 
4.5 Sample 
The sample window for the main tests runs from July 1997 through July 2001. I use Compustat 
quarterly for the accounting data, and CRSP for the returns data. I eliminate observations with a change in 
fiscal year end, financial institutions, utilities and foreign firms as they face a different regulatory 
structure and litigation environment. 
Audit Analytics provides a dataset of financial restatements that is well suited for this paper. This 
dataset identifies restatements by searching for terms such as “restate”, “error”, and “prior period 
adjustments”. They also collect all 8-Ks that contain “Item 4.02 Non Reliance” language. They then read 
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 This threshold is consistent with Beasley et al. (2010) who examine fraud in overlapping time periods and report 
that the median public company that engaged in fraud had a size of $100 million. In robustness tests I examine the 
sensitivity of my results to this threshold. 
30
 For example, the San Jose Mercury News documented the Silicon Graphics decision the day after by writing "a 
federal appeals court has given the high-technology industry a thickened coat of armor to defend itself against an 
avalanche of securities fraud cases" (Mintz 1999) [emphasis added]. See also the San Francisco Chronicle's report of 
the decision: "their [high tech firm's] lawyers convinced a federal appeals court to interpret the Reform Act so 
strictly that future lawsuits against high tech firms in Silicon Valley appear to have little chance of success 
[emphasis added] (Holding & Carlsen, 1999)." 
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all applicable 10-Ks and 10-Qs to ensure that the restatement is not caused by adoption of new accounting 
principles or revisions attributable to mergers and acquisitions.
31
 
One concern regarding the restatement data is that the Audit Analytics dataset begins capturing 
restatements publicly disclosed after January of 2000 while the event window runs from July 1997 
through July 2001. However, the construct of interest is not the disclosure of the restatement, itself, but 
rather the period over which financial statements violated GAAP. As demonstrated below, the restatement 
window (the period over which the financial statements violated GAAP) and the disclosure lag (the 
distance between the end of the restatement window and the public disclosure) are sufficiently large that 
the average restatement falling within the event window will be captured in the dataset.
32
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 This is based on private correspondence with an Audit Analytics representative. 
32
 See Figure 1 for a representation of the restatement timeline. 
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5.0 Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 describes the geographic composition of the sample. Approximately 25% of the total 
observations and 34% of the high-risk observations in the sample are headquartered in the Ninth Federal 
Circuit. Panel B demonstrates that 77% of the observations in the Ninth Federal Circuit are headquartered 
within the state of California. Panel C shows that around 6% of the observations in the sample are in the 
high-risk group headquartered in the Ninth Circuit (2% prior to the SGI decision and 4% after) while 
twice as many high-risk firms were headquartered outside the Ninth Circuit (12%).  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the samples used in the paper. Overall, the firms are 
large, profitable, use a big six auditor and have low abnormal returns around earnings announcements. 
Around 18% of the observations in the sample are high risk, average assets are around $1 billion, 
revenues around $283 million for the average firm, and 84% use a Big Six auditor. 
Panel B shows the correlations. The measure of discretionary revenues is positively correlated 
with Surge, MTB, ROA and SaleGrowth and negatively correlated with Leverage, Sales and BigSix. 
Overall, this suggests that levered firms subject to a more stringent auditor have lower discretionary 
revenues than faster growing firms.  
5.2 Testing Discretionary Revenues 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that managers of high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit 
recorded revenue more aggressively after the Silicon Graphics decision. Table 3 Panel A tabulates the 
results of equation (2), which tests this hypothesis. The first model examines only high-risk firms. The 
coefficient on the interaction between Post and Circuit9 is positive and statistically significant. This 
indicates that post SGI, high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit increased discretionary 
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revenues over the pre SGI period relative to high-risk firms headquartered in other jurisdictions, 
confirming hypothesis 1.  
Model 2 analyzes the non high-risk firms. The interaction term is not significant indicating that 
non high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit did not alter revenue recognition policy relative to 
non high-risk firms headquartered in other jurisdictions.  
Panel B tabulates tests of differences in the levels of discretionary revenues among groups and 
periods separately. The first test (column 1) examines the change in the levels of discretionary revenues 
before and after SGI within the same group. Results in this column indicate that the statistically 
significant interaction coefficient in Panel A is driven by an increase in discretionary revenues for high-
risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. Discretionary revenues actually declined over the event 
period for all other groups although the decline is not statistically significant. The increase in the level of 
discretionary revenues for the high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit is dramatic. In terms of 
magnitude, the increase for the mean (median) firm is equivalent to an increase in revenue of $13.5 ($2.6) 
million which is 3.7% (3.9%) of total revenues reported for the quarter. Further, column 2 (3) tests 
differences in the levels of discretionary revenues between high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth 
Circuit and all other firms before (after) the SGI decision. Results in column 2 indicate that the level of 
discretionary revenues for high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit was significantly lower than 
all other groups prior to the SGI decision. However, column 3 indicates that the level of discretionary 
revenues for high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit was no different from the other groups 
after the SGI decision.  
These results suggest that managers increased discretionary revenues in the period subsequent to 
the SGI ruling by recognizing revenue more slowly in the period prior to the SGI decision. Since cash 
flows equal accruals in the long term, discretionary actions to increase revenues must have either 
temporal consequences (in terms of reducing past or future revenues) or current financial consequences 
(in terms of a balance sheet effect in the current year). The results appear to be driven by the fact that 
discretionary revenues were abnormally low for high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit in the 
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two-year period prior to the SGI decision. Hence, managers "funded" an increase in discretionary 
revenues in the period subsequent to the SGI decision by reporting abnormally low discretionary revenues 
in the period preceding the SGI decision.  This is consistent with the well-recognized phenomenon that 
the Ninth Circuit provided one of the most favorable circuits to litigate securities class-action lawsuits 
prior to the SGI decision (Grundfest & Pritchard, 2002; Sale, 1998; Gibney, 2001; Perino, 2003). Overall, 
this panel indicates that the heightened risk of litigation prior to the SGI decision constrained managers 
from aggressively recognizing revenues. After the SGI decision reduced litigation risk, discretionary 
revenues increased to a level consistent with peer firms headquartered in other areas of the country. 
5.3 Testing Market Reaction to Unexpected Revenues 
Documenting a shift in discretionary revenues after the SGI decision, while interesting, is 
insufficient to determine whether class actions constrain managers from adopting aggressive revenue 
recognition practices. Managers could have recognized revenue more aggressively to signal private 
information or to opportunistically bias reporting. The prior motivation would presumably improve 
financial information while the latter would not. Equation 7 tests whether investors subsequently 
discounted unexpected revenues prior to the SGI decision. A decline in the investor response would 
indicate that the more aggressive revenue recognition policy after the SGI decision was likely 
opportunistic. An increase in the investor response would suggest that litigation risk actually inhibits 
managers from incorporating value-relevant information into the firm's revenue. Hypothesis 2 suggests 
that the market's reaction to unexpected revenues is attenuated for high-risk firms headquartered in the 
Ninth Circuit declined after the SGI decision. 
Table 4 tabulates the results of these tests. Column 1 is a baseline quarterly regression of 
abnormal returns on unexpected revenues. The Surge variable is positive and statistically significant 
indicating that an increase in unexpected revenues is associated with greater abnormal returns in the 
three-day window around the quarterly announcement. Economically, moving from the median 
observation to the 75
th
 percentile of unexpected revenues leads to an increased 3 day abnormal return of 
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1.5% for the baseline regression in column 1. This magnitude is consistent with prior literature (Kama, 
2009).  Column 2 is the difference-in-differences specification across high-risk firms. The three-way 
interaction among Surge, Post and Circuit9 is negative and significant. This indicates that the market 
response to unexpected revenues declined for high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit 
subsequent to the SGI decision relative to other firms.
33
 Column 3 is the same analysis over non high-risk 
firms. Consistent with the prior panel, which demonstrated no change in the level of discretionary 
revenues for the non high-risk firms, this model shows that the market reaction to unexpected revenues 
did not change for this population. Overall, results from this panel are consistent with the prior: a shift in 
the financial reporting process for high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. This panel 
complements the prior by demonstrating that the increase in discretionary reduced the information content 
of revenues. 
Panel B tabulates tests of differences in the revenue response coefficient among groups and 
periods separately. Column 1 examines differences in revenue response coefficients within the same 
group comparing the pre and post period. The only statistically significant change in the market response 
to unexpected revenues over the event period occurred in the Ninth Circuit, high-risk group where the 
market response to revenue declined by nearly 30%. The revenue response coefficient actually increased 
for all other groups, although the increase is not statistically significant. The difference between the pre 
and post value for the Ninth Circuit, high-risk group is very significant, economically. The mean (median) 
high-risk firm headquartered in the Ninth Circuit that reported a positive value of unexpected revenues 
after the SGI decision would have seen a .61% (.50%) increase in the three-day raw return had the market 
response to unexpected revenues not changed subsequent to the SGI decision.  
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 An alternative explanation for this result is that the reduction in market reactions is driven by an increase in 
voluntary earnings forecasts for the high-risk firms subsequent to the SGI decision. To test this, I included the 
number of voluntary forecasts issued in the quarter as a control variable, and also interacted it with the Surge 
variable. Untabulated results indicate that the coefficient of interest, the 3-way interaction among Surge, Circuit9 
and HighRisk increased slightly in magnitude and significance indicating that these results are not driven by a shift 
in the propensity of firms to issue a voluntary disclosure. I also examined a 60-day returns window to capture the 
incorporation of voluntary disclosure information other than management earnings forecasts. Results are very 
similar to those presented here. 
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The next columns test the nature of the shift in the market response to unexpected revenues 
documented in column 1. The market response to unexpected revenues could have been greater for high-
risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit prior to the SGI decision, and converged after the decision 
relative to other firms. Alternatively, the market response to unexpected revenues for high-risk firms 
headquartered in the Ninth Circuit could have been no different prior to the SGI decision, but declined 
after the SGI decision, relative to other firms. If the market rewards revenue surprises more when 
litigation risk is high, the former explanation would prevail. However, if the market response to litigation 
risk is more acute after a high-profile event, such as the SGI decision, then the latter explanation should 
dominate. Although the revenue response coefficient for the Ninth Circuit, high-risk group is higher than 
all other groups prior to the SGI decision, the difference is not statistically significant (column 2). Instead, 
the last column indicates that the revenue response coefficient for the Ninth Circuit, high-risk firms after 
the SGI decision is significantly lower than each of the other 3 groups. These results suggest that the 
punitive litigation environment in the Ninth Circuit prior to SGI did not affect market reactions to 
unexpected revenues during that period. However, after the SGI decision, investors became suspicious of 
unexpected revenues reported by firms most susceptible to litigation. 
Overall, this table is generally consistent with the results in the prior panel. The market response 
to unexpected revenues declined only for high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. This 
suggests that the discretion was opportunistic in nature and did not enhance the information available to 
the market. 
5.4 Testing the Likelihood of a Restatement  
The final hypothesis suggests that the likelihood of a restatement increased for Ninth Circuit 
firms subsequent to the SGI decision. Table 3 demonstrates that after the SGI decision, high-risk firms 
headquartered in the Ninth Circuit recognized revenue more quickly than before, relative to other firms. 
Table 4 suggests that this increase inhibited the information in revenues for market participants. While 
interesting, it could be that these high-risk firms complied with GAAP both before and after the shift. 
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Alternatively, restatements capture only shifts from reporting choices consistent with GAAP to those that 
violate GAAP. Accordingly, it captures more egregious violations of GAAP which are clearly indications 
that managers adopted aggressive reporting practices. 
Table 5 examines the restatement data used in this analysis. Panel A tabulates descriptive 
statistics of the restatement data and demonstrates that the average restatement that occurred during the 
SGI event window will be captured in the data. As discussed above, the SGI window runs from July 1997 
through July 2001. However, Audit Analytics did not begin collecting restatement data until January of 
2000. Per Panel A, the average restatement window for the entire dataset is 612 days. And, the average 
disclosure lag is 263 days meaning that the average delay between the beginning of the restatement 
window and disclosure is 875 days. Thus, the Audit Analytics sample will capture the average 
restatement beginning from mid 1997 through the end of the SGI event window. See Figure 2 for a 
timeline of restatement events.
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Panel B examines the change in restatements by the location of the firm’s headquarters and 
whether it occurred before or after SGI. As described above, the dataset will contain more restatements in 
the post SGI period because of the data collection process. Overall, the number of restatements nearly 
triples for firms headquartered within the Ninth Circuit while they just more than doubled outside the 
Ninth Circuit. The right side of the table scales these measures by the number of observations in each 
group. The proportion of restatements in and out of the Ninth Circuit roughly doubled after the SGI 
decision.  
Table 6 examines whether the probability of a restatement increased subsequent to the SGI 
decision in a multivariate setting.  Column 1 tests whether the likelihood of a restatement increased for 
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 Although a restatement in the pre period is captured in the data for the average firm there could be systematic 
differences in the disclosure timeline that would affect test results. For example, firms headquartered in the Ninth 
Circuit could announce restatements more timely relative to firms headquartered outside the Ninth Circuit in order 
to avoid litigation or reduce the class. In this case, the coefficient of interest would be biased in the predicted 
direction since the Ninth Circuit firms would demonstrate a larger increase in the post period because the data would 
pick up fewer restatements for the Ninth Circuit firms in the pre period (since the restatement disclosure would be 
delayed less and therefore occur before the data collection begins) relative to the other firms. Ultimately, it is an 
empirical issue whether firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit announce the restatement more timely relative to 
other firms. A t-test suggests that there is no difference in the means of either the disclosure lag or the period 
between the beginning of the restatement period through the disclosure date between the groups. 
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the average firm headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. The marginal effect of the interaction between post 
and Circuit9 is positive and significant at a p<.01 level. This indicates that the probability of a restatement 
increased for the average firm headquartered in the Ninth Circuit relative to the average firm 
headquartered in other judicial circuits after the SGI decision. The next columns split the sample 
according to the high-risk dimension. Results indicate that the increase in the likelihood of a restatement 
noted in column 1 is driven by the high-risk firms. Economically, the likelihood of a restatement after the 
SGI decision for high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit firms rose nearly 3% relative to before 
the SGI decision and relative to the change in restatements over the same period for firms headquartered 
outside the Ninth Circuit. This result supports hypothesis 3. 
5.5 Robustness 
This section conducts a series of tests to examine whether prior results are robust to a variety of 
alternative design choices. Table 7 tabulates the interaction coefficients in regressions centered on a 
pseudo-event date which is the actual event date shifted quarter-by-quarter forward and backward using 
the same four-year event window.
35
 For example, the coefficient reported in period Q+1 in the first 
column is the interaction in equation (2) between Post and Circuit9 using discretionary revenues as the 
dependent variable centered 1 quarter after the SGI decision. The column 2 tabulates tests that replicate 
Table 4 by reporting the three-way interaction among Post, Circuit9 and Surge. All specifications include 
the same controls as described above and standard errors clustered at the firm level. Results indicate that 
the increase in discretionary revenues and the decline in the investor reaction to unexpected revenues are 
concentrated around the actual event date and fade as the pseudo-event date moves away from the actual 
event date.   
The next tests examine the sensitivity of prior conclusions to alternative windows. All prior tables 
used a four-year window (two years prior and two years subsequent to the decision). Table 8 tabulates the 
results of these tests using windows of two years, one year and two quarters. Reported values are the 
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 Restatements cannot be examined in this test because of data constraints. 
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variables of interest, which are the interactions between Circuit9 and the Post indicator for the 
discretionary revenues and restatement tests and the interaction among Circuit9, Post and Surge for the 
market reaction tests.  
Results of these robustness tests demonstrate two important effects. First, the change in the levels 
of discretionary revenues and the likelihood of a restatement is robust to alternative window lengths. 
However, results for the market reactions do not, in general, hold over shorter windows.
36
 This could be 
attributable to a poorly specified expectations or abnormal returns model. Also, it could be that managers 
of some firms altered financial reporting policy in order to convey private information to market 
participants. Thus, litigation risk prior to the SGI decision may have been so high that it prevented 
managers from selecting the most informative accounting policies. In this case, the information content of 
revenues would increase subsequent to the SGI decision for these firms, which would counteract the 
decline in the market response for the opportunistic firms. The other important result to note from this 
table is that the coefficients of interest are generally significant for the average firm, but this result is 
driven by the high-risk firms. 
Overall, Tables 7 and 8 suggest that the results in prior panels were not driven by general trends 
which occurred in the Ninth Circuit relative to firms headquartered in other legal jurisdictions. Instead, 
the change in discretionary revenues and market reactions is concentrated around the event date, itself. 
Further, results generally hold over very short windows making it less likely that a confounding event is 
driving the results as this event would have had to occur during the same quarter as the SGI decision. 
I also perform a series of untabulated tests to examine whether research design choices affect the 
results. I used raw values of discretionary revenues and abnormal returns, values winsorized at 5%, 
lowered the total assets requirement to $10 million, raised it to $200 million, and used a probit model to 
test restatements. I extended the returns window from three days centered on the event date to 60 days 
prior to the earnings announcement through the day after (+1). I also explored other expectations models 
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 This coefficient is negative and significant in a window of four quarters prior and one quarter subsequent to the 
decision providing some evidence that the market response to unexpected revenues for firms headquartered in the 
Ninth Circuit did decline in the quarter immediately following the decision. 
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such as a seasonal random walk, and models scaled by lagged total assets instead of standardized. 
Inferences from all analyses remain unchanged.  
Next, I examined whether discretionary accruals changed over the event period. Although the link 
between litigation and accounting outcomes is strongest in the revenue account, it may affect total 
accruals. I measured the level of discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional, modified-Jones 
approach advocated by Teoh et al. (1998). I find that the levels of discretionary accruals are significantly 
larger for both high-risk and non high-risk groups headquartered in the Ninth Circuit relative to firms 
headquartered in other jurisdictions using the difference-in-differences model illustrated in Table 3. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
Class-action lawsuits under securities laws impose tremendous costs on the U.S. economy and are 
growing in popularity throughout the world. Despite their perceived importance in regulating securities 
markets, little empirical evidence exists regarding whether they constrain managers from reporting 
opportunistically. Accordingly, this paper examines the alleged benefits of class actions by testing 
whether an unexpected decline in litigation risk affects the levels of discretionary revenues, the market 
reaction to unexpected revenues and the likelihood of a financial restatement. 
Empirically, I first identify a court decision that reduced the risk of shareholder litigation only for 
firms headquartered within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This decision is a strong 
setting to examine as it affected legal outcomes (Pritchard & Sale, 2005; Perino, 2003), was unexpected, 
widely publicized in popular media, unlikely to be driven by environmental factors and only affected a 
subset of firms based upon the geographic location of the headquarters.  
Then, I examine the changes in the levels of discretionary revenues, the market reactions to 
unexpected revenues, and the likelihood of a restatement for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit 
relative to firms headquartered in other federal circuits. These outcomes each capture a unique aspect of 
the financial reporting process and provide insight into the nature of the reporting change (informative 
versus opportunistic) as well as whether the change was subtle or more egregious. 
Results indicate that the likelihood of a restatement and the levels of discretionary revenues 
increased while the investor reaction to revenue surprises declined after the decision for firms affected by 
the decision relative to firms not affected. Further, these reporting changes were driven by firms that 
faced the highest risk of litigation. Overall, the risk of class-action lawsuits filed under securities laws 
constrains managers from adopting aggressive reporting practices. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the U.S. Federal Court System 
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Figure 2: Timeline of Restatements 
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Dependent Variables
CAR = the three-day, cumulative abnormal return centered on the earnings
announcement date adjusted by the market return for the same size decile;
DiscRev = the level of discretionary revenues for firm i in quarter q as defined by Stubben
(2010) and estimated as the residual in equation (1);
Restate = indicator variable that takes a value of (1) if the observation was subsequently
restated as a result of an intentional violation of GAAP. Similar to Hennes, Leone 
and Miller (2008) I identify restatements where either 1) fraud is explicitly
mentioned in the restatement announcement 2) there is a corresponding SEC
investigation or 3) there is a subsequent class action lawsuit and (0) otherwise;
Variables of Interest
Circuit9 = indicator variable that takes a (1) value if the firm is headquartered within the
jurisdiction of the 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals and (0) otherwise;
HighRisk = indicator variable that takes a value of (1) if the firm has the following SIC noted
in Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994) (2833-2836, 8731-8734, 3570-3577, 7370-
7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961) and assets exceed $100 million and (0) otherwise;
Post = indicator variable that takes a (1) value if the observation occurs after the 9th
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals published the decision in re. Silicon Graphics
Securities Litig. (183 F.3d 970) on July 2, 1999 and (0) otherwise;
Surge = revenue surprise where revenue (REVTQ) expectation is modeled as a seasonal
random walk with a drift term following (Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006) and
described in equation (3) above;
Control Variables
Assets = total assets (ATQ);
Beta = the Beta coefficient obtained using the market model estimated over the period
from 100 days to 2 days before the earnings announcement date;
BigSix = indicator variable that takes a value of (1) if the current auditor was a member of
the Big Six;
ExpenseSurp = expense surprise where expense expectation is modeled as a seasonal random
walk with a drift term following the same methodology used to measure Surge
(Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006) and described in equation (3) above. Expenses are
measured as all accounts that roll into after tax income (IBQ) not modeled in the
Surge variable (TXTQ, MIIQ, XINTQ, SPIQ, NOPIQ, DPQ, XOPRQ). Missing
values of the expense variables are set to (0);
Income = income before extraordinary items (IBQ);
Leverage = total long term debt (DLTTQ) divided by total assets (ATQ);
Loss = indicator variable that takes a value of (1) if the observation has negative net
income (IBQ) and (0) otherwise;
MTB = market to book ratio defined as market value (closing price in last fiscal year
(PRCC_F)*number of shares outstanding (CSHO)) divided by total book value
(TBV);
Nonlinear = unexpected revenues * absolute value of unexpected revenues;
Persist = the autoregressive coefficient from the Foster (1977) model;
(Continued on next page)
EXHIBIT 1
Variable Definitions
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Control Variables
Predict = firm constant measure of the predictability of unexpected revenues measured as
the mean absolute value of unexpected revenues measured over the entire
sample period;
Return = daily return compounded for the quarter ending on the quarterly balance sheet
date;
ROA = return on assets defined as income before extraordinary items (IBQ) divided by
assets as the beginning of the quarter (ATQq-1);
Sales = quarterly revenues reported (SALEQ);
SaleGrowth = the seasonally adjusted difference in the most recent quarters of total sales
(SALEQq - SALEQq-4) scaled by total assets as of the beginning of the
seasonally adjusted period (ATQq-4);
Size = log of market value of equity;
EXHIBIT 1 (Continued)
Variable Definitions
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Panel A: Sample makeup by jurisdiction over the SGI event period
circuit # of Obs. % of Obs. # of HighRisk Obs. % of HighRisk Obs.
1 3,126        7% 676 9%
2 4,149        10% 617 8%
3 3,828        9% 628 8%
4 2,488        6% 441 6%
5 4,327        10% 497 6%
6 2,906        7% 535 7%
7 2,441        6% 369 5%
8 2,774        7% 432 6%
9 10,442      25% 2,670 34%
10 2,379        6% 285 4%
11 3,339        8% 585 8%
DC 43             0% 7 0%
42,242 100 7,742 100%
Panel B: Ninth U.S. Circuit by the State of the Firm's Headquarters
STATE Freq. Percent
AK 7 0%
AZ 663 6%
CA 7,997 77%
HI 61 1%
ID 104 1%
MT 45 0%
NV 259 2%
OR 550 5%
WA 756 7%
10,442 100
TABLE 1
Composition of the Sample
(Continued on next page)
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Circuit9 HighRisk Pre Post
Y Y 1,031 1,639
Y N 3,804 3,968
N Y 2,256 2,816
N N 13,036 13,692
20,127 22,115
Circuit9 HighRisk Pre Post
Y Y 2% 4%
Y N 9% 9%
N Y 5% 7%
N N 31% 32%
48% 52%
Panel C: Identification of Observations by Group
# of Observations per Group
% of Observations per Group
This table demonstrates the geographical and temporal makeup of the sample. Panel A tabulates
observations according to the location of the headquarters over the SGI event period (4 year window
centered on July 2, 1999). HighRisk firms are those with assets in excess of $100 million and in an industry
identified by Francis et al. (1994). Panel B tabulates observations within the Ninth Circuit by the state
where the firm is headquartered. Panel C tabulates the observations according to whether they fall inside
the Ninth Circuit and HighRisk group and whether they occur before (Pre) or after (Post) the Silicon
Graphics decision.
TABLE 1 (continued)
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Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl
Assets 1,067.88 8,455.40 27.26 101.96 408.70
BigSix 0.84 0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00
CAR 0.00 0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05
Circuit9 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
Discrev 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.02
HighRisk 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income 10.77 236.74 -1.07 0.39 4.38
Leverage 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.10 0.28
MTB 2.86 7.10 0.84 1.69 3.42
ROA -0.03 0.14 -0.03 0.01 0.02
Sales 283.71 1,367.53 5.69 27.75 119.96
SaleGrowth 0.05 0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.08
Size 4.68 2.06 3.31 4.62 6.01
SURGE 0.08 1.56 -0.83 0.18 0.95
TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics and correlations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) Assets 1.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.32 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.76 -0.01 0.27 -0.01
(2) BigSix 0.44 1.00 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.45 -0.01
(3) CAR 0.04 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.10
(4) Circuit9 -0.06 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.10 -0.01 -0.14 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.01
(5) Discrev -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.02
(6) HighRisk 0.37 0.17 0.03 0.10 -0.02 1.00 0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.34 -0.02
(7) Income 0.49 0.15 0.12 -0.09 0.05 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.33 0.00 0.11 0.00
(8) Leverage 0.34 0.06 0.01 -0.18 -0.03 -0.04 0.11 1.00 -0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.21 0.03
(9) MTB 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.19 -0.16 1.00 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.01
(10) ROA 0.32 0.11 0.15 -0.06 0.08 0.11 0.82 0.00 0.19 1.00 0.06 0.11 0.36 0.05
(11) Sales 0.92 0.39 0.06 -0.09 -0.01 0.33 0.58 0.34 0.08 0.43 1.00 0.02 0.41 0.00
(12) SaleGrowth 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.27 0.00 0.23 0.35 0.19 1.00 0.06 0.39
(13) Size 1.00 0.44 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.37 0.49 0.34 0.12 0.32 0.92 0.12 1.00 -0.02
(14) SURGE 0.00 0.00 0.11 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.51 0.00 1.00
Panel B: Pearson (Spearman) correlations for the sample above (below) diagonal 
This table provides descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) diagonal 
of variables used in this paper. Bolded variables are significant at the P<.05 level. Variables are defined in Exhibit 1.
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(1) (2)
HighRisk=1 HighRisk=0
Constant 0.011* 0.006***
(1.45) (3.58)
Post -0.002* -0.001*
(-1.35) (-1.45)
Circuit9 -0.011*** 0.001
(-3.57) (0.46)
Post*Circuit9 0.011*** 0.000
(3.21) (0.14)
Controls:
Size -0.002*** 0.00
(-2.71) (0.19)
Leverage -0.008** -0.008***
(-2.10) (-3.38)
ROA 0.019** 0.020***
(2.16) (5.19)
BigSix 0.003 -0.005***
(0.44) (-3.40)
SaleGrowth 0.001 0.012***
(0.09) (2.33)
MTB 0.000*** 0.000***
(2.50) (3.26)
N 7,644 34,938
R-Squared 0.012 0.008
TABLE 3
Tests of Discretionary Revenues
Panel A: Difference in Differences Estimation of Equation (2)
(Continued on next page)
43 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Circuit9 HighRisk Pre Post
Diff between 
Pre and Post 
(P-Value)
Diff between 
Circuit9, HighRisk 
and row value in Pre 
period (P-Value)
Diff between Circuit9, 
HighRisk and row 
value in Post period 
(P-Value)
Y Y -0.003 0.005 <.01
Y N 0.007 0.006 0.66 <.01 0.69
N Y 0.008 0.005 0.14 <.01 0.96
N N 0.006 0.005 0.15 <.01 0.97
Panel B: Tests of Changes in Discretionary Revenues Across Groups
***,**,* represents significance at a p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 level, respectively using one-sided tests and robust
t-statistics clustered at the firm level. This table examines reported discretionary revenues around the Silicon
Graphics decision for firms headquartered inside and outside the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Panel A tabulates the results of equation (2) with DiscRev as the dependent variable. The event window is 4
years wide centered on the event date (July 2, 1999). Model 1 includes only HighRisk observations while model
2 includes all observations that are not HighRisk. The key variables of interest Circuit9 (Post) represent
observations where the firm is headquartered in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (occur after the
Silicon Graphics decision on July 2, 1999). Variables are defined in Exhibit 1. Panel B tabulates the differences of
the levels of discretionary revenues across periods for the same group and across groups for the same period.
Column 1 compares the level of discretionary revenues before and after the Silicon Graphics decision within the
same group. The test tabulated in column 2 (3) compares the levels of discretionary revenues for high-risk firms
headquartered in the Ninth Circuit with other groups prior to (subsequent to) the Silicon Graphics decision. 
TABLE 3 (continued)
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(1) (2) (3)
Full  HighRisk=1  HighRisk=0
Constant 0.013*** 0.005 0.019***
(2.92) (0.33) (3.74)
Surge 0.021*** 0.009 0.021***
(7.50) (1.16) (6.82)
Circuit9 0.007** 0.004**
(1.91) (2.06)
Post 0.001 -0.002*
(0.26) (-1.45)
Post*Circuit9 -0.001 -0.002
(-0.21) (-0.70)
Surge*Post 0.001 0.001
(0.76) (1.28)
Surge*Circuit9 0.002 0.001
(1.05) (0.78)
Surge*Post*Circuit9 -0.007** 0.001
(-2.21) (0.65)
Surge*Loss -0.005*** -0.003* -0.005***
(-5.92) (-1.57) (-5.79)
Surge*Size -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001***
(-8.22) (-1.03) (-7.50)
Surge*Beta -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.25) (-0.38) (-0.78)
Surge*Predict -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.12) (-0.01) (-0.06)
Surge*Persist 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.38) (0.53) (0.52)
Surge*ExpenseSurp 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
(1.49) (0.37) (1.47)
Surge*MTB -0.000 0.000** -0.000
(-0.41) (1.78) (-1.13)
Nonlinear -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-5.52) (-2.73) (-4.91)
Predict -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(-0.72) (0.07) (-0.48)
Persist 0.007*** 0.015** 0.005*
(2.48) (1.94) (1.44)
ExpenseSurp -0.004*** -0.003** -0.005***
(-8.27) (-2.24) (-8.24)
MTB 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000**
(3.47) (2.94) (2.08)
Beta -0.000 0.001 -0.002**
(-0.35) (0.37) (-2.01)
Size -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(-5.40) (-2.81) (-6.31)
(Continued on next page)
TABLE 4
Tests of Market Returns to Unexpected Revenues
Panel A: Difference in Differences Estimation of Equation (7)
Controls:
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(1) (2) (3)
Full  HighRisk=1  HighRisk=0
Loss -0.025*** -0.018*** -0.026***
(-19.77) (-6.16) (-18.97)
N 40,923 8,361 32,562
R-Squared 0.030 0.017 0.037
TABLE 4 (continued)
Tests of Market Returns to Unexpected Revenues
Panel A: Difference in Differences Estimation of Equation (7)
 
(1) (2) (3)
Circuit9 HighRisk Pre Post
Diff between 
Pre and Post 
(P-Value)
Diff between 
Circuit9, HighRisk 
and row value in Pre 
period (P-Value)
Diff between Circuit9, 
HighRisk and row 
value in Post period 
(P-Value)
Y Y 0.021 0.015 0.04
Y N 0.020 0.023 0.19 0.79 <0.01
N Y 0.019 0.020 0.58 0.34 0.05
N N 0.019 0.020 0.19 0.43 0.02
***,**,* represents significance at a p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 level, respectively using one-sided tests and
robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level. This table examines the market reaction to unexpected revenues
around the Silicon Graphics decision for firms headquartered inside and outside the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. Panel A tabulates the results of equation (7) which are quarterly regressions with 3 day
abnormal returns centered on the earnings announcement date as a dependent variable and using a 4 year
window centered on the event date (July 2,1999). The first model includes all observations while the second
(third) are constrained to include only high-risk (non high-risk) observations. Panel B tests the differences in
the levels of the market reaction to unexpected revenues across periods for the same group and across
groups for the same period. Test 1 compares the market reaction to unexpected revenues before and after the 
Silicon Graphics decision within the same group. The test tabulated in column 2 (3) compares the market
reaction to unexpected revenues for high-risk firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit with other groups
prior to (subsequent to) the Silicon Graphics decision. 
Panel B: Tests of Changes in Discretionary Revenues Across Groups
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N Mean Median
Beginning of restatement period 
to disclosure
      10,932 875 775
End of restatement period to 
disclosure
      10,932 263 183
Duration of restatement period       10,932 612 365
TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics of Restatements
Panel A: Timing of Restatements in Audit Analytics Database (in days)
 
Circuit9 Other Circuit9 Other
Pre SGI 134 262 2.3% 1.3%
Post SGI 329 553 4.9% 2.6%
This table describes the timing and incidence of restatements. Panel A describes the timing of
restatements in the Audit Analytic restatement database as of March 2011. Audit Analytics
began collecting restatement data as of first quarter, 2000. Tabulated figures in columns 3 and 4
are the mean and median days from either the beginning (row 1) or end (row 2) of the disclosure
window. Panel B presents the number of restatements according to whether it occurs before or
after the SGI decision and which federal circuit the restating firm was headquartered. The right
side of the panel scales the number of restatements by the number of observations within the
category.
Number of Restatements
Panel B: Frequency of Restatements on the Event Study Sample
As a % of Total Obs.
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(1) (2) (3)
Full  HighRisk=1  HighRisk=0
Circuit9 0.017** 0.039 0.008*
(2.10) (1.21) (1.29)
Post 0.024*** 0.052*** 0.015***
(4.98) (2.86) (3.82)
Post*Circuit9 0.019** 0.042** 0.002
(2.32) (1.72) (0.30)
Controls:
Size 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.003***
(6.05) (2.98) (2.71)
Leverage -0.013 0.005 -0.005
(-1.25) (0.14) (-0.62)
ROA 0.015 0.031 0.015
(0.96) (0.47) (1.20)
BigSix 0.010* -0.000 0.006
(1.30) (-0.00) (1.08)
SaleGrowth 0.031*** 0.043** 0.020***
(4.75) (1.79) (3.61)
MTB 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.77) (1.03) (-0.44)
N 45,057 8,493 36,564
Pseudo R-Squared 0.08 0.05 0.04
***,**,* represents significance at a p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 level, respectively using one-sided tests and
robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level. This table tabulates the average marginal effects of a logistic
regression where the dependent variable takes a value of one if the firm-quarter observation was
subsequently restated for an egregious violation of GAAP. The marginal effect reported for the interaction
term is calculated using the delta method, consistent with prior literature in accounting (Bushman, Dai and
Wang, 2010). The sample period extends from two years prior to the event date (July 2, 1999) to two years
after the event date excluding the fiscal year that straddles the SGI decision. This is done as firms that
subsequently announce restatements for more egregious violations of GAAP likely restate the full year.
Hence, quarters occurring prior to the decision could be restated for violations that occur subsequent to the 
SGI decision. Variables are defined in Exhibit 1. 
TABLE 6
Test of Restatements
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Period
Q-8 -0.003 -0.001
Q-7 -0.004 -0.002
Q-6 -0.003 -0.001
Q-5 -0.002 -0.003
Q-4 -0.001 -0.003
Q-3 0.001 -0.004
Q-2 0.003 -0.006 **
Q-1 0.007 ** -0.008 ***
Q 0.011 *** -0.007 **
Q+1 0.010 *** -0.005 *
Q+2 0.009 *** -0.006 **
Q+3 0.009 *** -0.004 *
Q+4 0.008 *** -0.004 *
Q+5 0.006 ** -0.003
Q+6 0.004 * -0.001
Q+7 0.001 0.003
Q+8 -0.001 0.006 **
***,**,* represents significance at a p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 level, respectively using one-sided tests and robust t-
statistics clustered at the firm level. This table presents the coefficients of interest from 4 year window quarterly
estimations centered on pseudo-event dates which represent the actual event window shifted forward and
backward, quarter-by-quarter. Period Q replicates results presented in Tables 3 and 4 while Q+1 shifts the event
date forward by one quarter and conducts the same multivariate estimation with all controls, standard errors
clustered at the firm level and 4 year windows centered on the new event date. Column one replicates Table 3 using
discretionary revenues as the dependent variable. Reported values are the coefficients on the interaction between
Post and Circuit9 from equation (2). Column 2 replicates Table 4 with abnormal returns regressed on Surge.
Reported coefficients are the coefficients on the three-way interaction among Post, Circuit9 and Surge from
equation (7). Variables are defined in Exhibit 1. 
Revenue Response 
Coefficient
Discretionary 
Revenues
TABLE 7
Tests of Rolling Regressions Using Pseudo-Event Dates
(1) (2)
  
 
4
9
 
  
All HighRisk=1 HighRisk=0 All HighRisk=1 HighRisk=0 All HighRisk=1 HighRisk=0
0.004** 0.013*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.016*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.005**
(1.75) (2.92) (0.81) (2.37) (3.62) (1.12) (2.79) (3.66) (1.68)
0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.005* 0.003 -0.000 0.005
(0.41) (-0.85) (1.03) (0.93) (-0.48) (1.48) (0.78) (-0.02) (1.06)
Restatements 0.019** 0.042** 0.006 0.024*** 0.048** 0.010 0.024** 0.046** 0.011
(2.17) (1.76) (0.68) (2.40) (1.83) (0.97) (2.31) (1.70) (1.04)
TABLE 8
Short Window Tests
***,**,* represents significance at a p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1 level, respectively using one-sided tests and robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level.
These models test the robustness of prior tests to alternate window lengths. Tabulated statistics are the coefficients of interest which represent the
interaction between Circuit9 and Post for the discretionary revenues and restatement tests and the three-way interaction among Circuit9, Post and
Surge for the market response to unexpected revenues tests. The definitions of the windows are as follows for the discretionary revenues and market
response to unexpected revenues: a 2 year window is a sample of 1 year prior to the decision though 1 year after the SGI decision, a 1 year window is
2 quarters prior to the decision through 2 quarters after the decision, a 2 quarter window is 1 quarter prior through 1 quarter after the SGI decision.
The windows for restatement tests are defined in the same manner except the fiscal year that straddles the SGI decision is excluded. This is done as
firms that subsequently issue restatements for more egregious violations of GAAP likely restate the full year. Hence, quarters occurring prior to the
decision could be restated for violations that occur subsequent to the SGI decision.
Market Response to 
Unexpected Revenues
Discretionary 
Revenues
Two Year Window One Year Window Two Quarter Window
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